Russia-Ukraine war and the future of European Politics

The European Union (EU), since its inception, has been the face of unity in International politics. As an exemplary model of alliance, in a world full of divided nations and militarised borders. The EU has proved time and time again that despite different outlooks, states can come together on combined and collective policymaking and action. This remained true following the Russian invasion of Ukraine  in early 2022, as the EU was quick to formulate its response and present Russia with a unified front. As the war continues, a look into the impacts of war shows rocky domestic politics within Europe. Despite being in its early stages, such cases tend to stick out like a sore thumb. The EU should stay vigilant lest Russia takes dissenting voices as a fallout between Europe.

It is a year and a half since Russian troops invaded Ukraine and started a full-fledged war, a war that was unforeseen at least by the majority of commentators, because since the end of the Second World War, Europe was not expecting to see another horrifying conflict within its territory. However, despite the unexpected nature of the war, hostility between Russia and Ukraine is not a new phenomenon. It dates back many years, with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 being one of the major events to take place as a result of this animosity. 

Today as Russia continues to show aggression, the world observes the deep-rooted issues that it leaves in its wake. The economic crisis following the onset of war has not only spread across Europe but also significantly impacted countries across the globe. Disrupted supply chains of gas and oil created an overall environment of economic insecurity among the European states. Europe that was once heavily dependent on Russian gas and oil has now had to cut back completely on Russian supplies, turning to other providers such as Qatar. Governments have also had to pay millions in subsidies, in order to protect the masses from hiked prices. 

Russia has also had to face a surge of individual sanctions since the war started, the numbers reaching around 13,840 since the invasion. These sanctions might have become a deterrent for Russia, however, that is not the case. One of the reasons could be attributed to the fact that over the years the country has made itself self-sufficient, hence no drastic effect. Subsequently, certain commentators believe that prolonged sanctions could lead to reduction in production capacity. This is due to the fact that there are export restrictions. Secondly, Putin does not seem bothered by the sanctions and has not expressed any desire for negotiations in order to lessen the sanctions. For Europe this is a matter of concern because the lack of apprehension from Russia shows that the war could go on for long. 

Apart from the economic crisis, the war has taken a toll on the political conditions of Europe as well. Although the European Union manages to get every member state on one page, in most instances, there are certain divisions between the states. Said divisions are now apparent in the response countries have towards Russia. Hungary and Slovakia have remained neutral opposing sanctions against Russia. Austria has also gone back to pre-war levels of gas imports. These are all indicative of the fact that these divisions could play a decisive role in the future politics of the EU.  

Since the war is a developing story, conclusive remarks cannot be made for the future of the EU, but that does not steer us clear from speculating that European politics could look notably different if the current divisions remain unaddressed. If looked at in detail this disunity predates the war, while some analysts have claimed that this disunity existed since the end of the Cold War, but was never dealt with in a coherent manner. Within the European Union, the member states have often preferred bilateral ties with Russia rather than a common EU approach. This is relevant today too since Central and Eastern European countries often do not see eye to eye with Western European states. 

Viktor Orban, the Hungarian Prime Minister, has made sure to leave no room for doubt when it comes to showing support for Russia. The invasion of Ukraine took place a few days before elections in Hungary and the Fidesz party has since then been very open and vocal about their alliance with Russia. As a result, Hungary stood isolated and at the brink of economic turmoil which resulted in increased narrative building against the EU. Similarly, Slovakia is nearing elections where a pro-Russia candidate is set to win, this could seriously derail the EU’s unified stance against Russia. 

This brings forth the next concern for European politics, which is an increase in right-wing populist sentiments. Although in most cases it is not reflected in the foreign policies of states and remains a domestic matter, one cannot completely disregard its existence. A rise in such sentiments today could mean something grave for European politics tomorrow. With politicians like Orban already in power and others like Robert Fico preparing to come into power, pro-kremlin foreign policy might become a dilemma for the European Union. 

In addition to this the right wing populist party in Austria, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), has been cautious in expressing its views on the Russian invasion so that it does not appear as an outright supporter of Russia. There is a sentiment too that the European policy towards Russia is not in everyone’s favour and that it was carried out without the consent of the people. As a result, The EU is blamed for the economic insecurity and deteriorating condition that Austrian people have to face. Keeping in mind that Austria has also gone back to importing Russian gas, the country remains on the radar for possible future alliance with the Kremlin. Such instances seem insignificant but could raise serious questions about the political state of Europe and the teetering face of unity that the EU presents. 

If not addressed and dealt with on time these states could potentially have a spillover effect on neighbouring countries, if that is the case Europe might have to deal with member countries not abiding by the values and principles of liberal democracies. Such fragmentation within Europe would not only be a matter of concern for other member countries but also a way forward for Russia. The Kremlin has previously used divisions within Europe to its own advantage. Had the annexation of Crimea in 2014 been addressed with proper rigour and force, Russia would have reconsidered invading Ukraine. It comes down to why Putin was able to plan a militarised invasion? Whether the EU was strong enough in its opposition or not? If Europe is not serious about the disunity, Russia would use that to its full advantage. This not only means that the current war would be prolonged but also that other avenues of disruption and conflict would be explored by Russia. 

Fatima Nawaz

Research Intern 

The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (PIIA)

A Step Back in Time: The Ukraine War’s Weight Over the Energy Question

On June 20, 2022, as Russian state-controlled gas provider Gazprom announced its decision to slash natural gas flows to its Western European clients via the Nord Stream pipeline to 40% capacity, Germany – followed shortly after by Austria and the Netherlands – took the decision to turn towards their coal-fired power plants to try to curb natural gas consumption. Of this policy measure, Germany’s economic minister Robert Habeck lamented that “[i]t [is] bitter but indispensable for reducing gas consumption.” Habeck’s statement was issued on June 19, amid fears of gas shortages vis-à-vis the continuation of the Russia-Ukraine crisis since February this year. Such a move, one might say, could be viewed as an exercise in self-reliance to reduce dependencies on gas imports. However, upon looking at the wider picture, it is difficult to shake off how Germany – the state that sought to lead the ‘green energy’ movement – is now compelled to re-consider its climate action ambitions win to the incumbent geopolitical developments. 

To better understand the implications of such measures through the center-periphery dichotomy, it is imperative to establish the context of the politics of natural resources in relation to the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Russia, the largest natural gas exporter in the world and home to some of the largest gas reserves, accounted for 45% of the European Union (EU)’s gas imports in 2021. Following the Russian decision to recognize the “independence and sovereignty” of the ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (LNR) and ‘Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR)’ regions of Ukraine in addition to Russia’s invasion of the stated territories, the United States (US) and EU instituted a series of coordinated sanctions in response to what was viewed as a belligerent move by Russian President Vladimir Putin. This sanctions regime was met by Putin signing a decree demanding payment of foreign gas to be made in rubles from 1^st April 2022. 

While Denmark, Finland and Poland have decried this decree as tantamount to blackmail, with Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen lambasting that “[t]his is totally not acceptable… [and is] a kind of blackmailing from Putin,” countries such as Germany are facing an even more precarious conundrum. In addition to being Europe’s largest economy, Germany saw Russia accounting for 55% of the state’s gas imports in 2021 and 40% in the first quarter of 2022. 

The case becomes more convoluted when one factors in Germany’s role as a global environmental leader – one which spearheaded several climate goals for Europe, most notably the total phaseout of coal target for the year 2030 and the EU’s decision to increase the share of renewables in the bloc’s energy production to 40%, also targeted for 2030.

One cannot help but question how the suspension of environmental concerns (especially from its most vocal proponents) in the face of complex geopolitical developments is given justifications, while those states located in the ‘periphery’ were heavily criticized for proceeding ahead with Russian oil imports. It appears in the realm of energy politics, only the ‘periphery’ will be trapped within moral dilemmas while the ‘center’ can afford to simply sidestep them. Whether it is Germany, Denmark, or the United Kingdom (UK), it is puzzling to see some of the champions of environmental activism now stepping back in time and justifying their decisions to revive coal power-plants. 

Concomitantly, there is a profound sense of urgency in the Western bloc to branch out and seek alternative suppliers for oil imports to curtail Russia’s weight over the global energy market. A notable instance of such a development is illustrated in the US’ State Department permitting Italian oil company Eni SpA and Spain’s Repsol SA to begin shipping Venezuelan oil to Europe in a bid to reduce dependence on Russia. It is worth mentioning that when the Venezuelan oil industry was hit by a wave of US-led sanctions in 2019, Russia was quick to fill the gaps experienced by US refiners, according to a David Smilde. What is particularly intriguing, Smilde notes, is that the US’ Gulf-coast based oil refinery industry is suited for a heavier grade of crude oil such as Venezuela’s or Russia’s, with light oil grades like Saudi Arabia’s or US shale drillers being unsuitable, infrastructurally. This context leads to the question: is it exclusively in the Western bloc’s jurisdiction to establish and re-establish who is the new global ‘antagonist’ or who is the new ‘ally?’ An affirmative answer indicates that the global order is one which is fortified by Euro-centric and Western-centric concerns which, by extension, are shaped to represent international concerns. 

If the periphery attempted to challenge the Western-centric setting and re-setting of the international order, charges predicated on the ‘enabling’ of anti-democratic and authoritarian regimes (in addition to not ‘doing enough’ on the climate front) would be lodged. Upon probing such accusations, it appears as though there exists a certain monopoly over narratives by the ‘center’ that transcend beyond the domain of energy politics. By continuing to entrench this power-play whereby the application of moral standards and considerations markedly differ according to where one is placed in the center-periphery dichotomy, we only run the risk of deepening mistrust, derailing opportunities for conflict resolution and international cooperation and harkening back to (neo)colonial power relations. 

Ana Tawfiq Husain is a Dean’s Fellow and Lecturer in the Social Development and Policy Program at Habib University, Karachi. She attained her MA in International Relations from King’s College London and her BA (Hons.) in Social Development and Policy with a Minor in History from Habib University.

‘The current Afghan state is finished’

News article: webinar on the topic ‘Afghanistan at the Crossroads’ 

Anatol Lieven, senior research fellow, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, Washington, was the first of the three main speakers. He said he was a journalist with the Mujahideen in the late 1980s and then briefly on the government side. He has visited Afghanistan intermittently since then, so his association with the country goes back 34 years. In his view what is happening seems to be in accordance with certain basic patterns of modern Afghan history; above all, the failure to establish a modern state, whether by Afghans themselves or outside forces. Mr Lieven said: “It is my sense that the current Afghan state is finished. It may last for longer than some people expect, but according to independent analysts 197 district centres have fallen to the Taliban since May.

Much will depend upon whether the US will continue airstrikes to defend the main cities, but I don’t think that will be enough. If patterns of Afghan history are anything to go by, the collapse of the state, when it comes, may come very quickly and unexpectedly. The reason is, as we saw in 1992, Afghan society is [in] a kind of process of constant conversation and negotiation. In the late 1980s it was common knowledge that there were endless negotiations between themselves and local state garrisons.”He said, on the other hand, we will see in certain areas that certain ethno-religious minority groups, notably the Hazaras and the Panjshiris, will not surrender to the Taliban. Therefore, the subsequent history of Afghanistan will be determined by the following questions:

‘Fundamental uncertainty’: Keynesian economics and COVID-19

With the colossal scale of the crises looming over the global economy, perhaps now is as crucial a time as ever to revisit the Keynesian notion of ‘fundamental uncertainty’

‘By uncertain knowledge,’ wrote John Maynard Keynes in 1921, ‘I do not mean merely to distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable…There is no scientific basis to form any calculable probability whatsoever. We simply do not know.’ Upon reading these words (written in the middle of the worst influenza pandemic in history, the Spanish Influenza!) in our contemporary setting, there is a pertinent case to be made that the global crisis that is taking the world by a storm necessitates a re-examination of Keynes’ foundational concept of ‘fundamental uncertainty.’ Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and its mammoth economic consequences for the global economy, a string of crises erupted that have not only rattled the foundational basis of the incumbent liberal world order but is, according to professor of economics Timofey V. Bordachev, ‘living its last days.’ Alain de Benoist describes the pandemic as a ‘catalyst’ with regard to the decline and disintegration of this liberal world order, arguing that this new economic and social crisis could give rise to a new financial crisis, one that ‘has been expected for years.’ 

Of all the unprecedented financial blows of 2020, the news concerning the extraordinary decline in global economic activity leading to the United States’ oil prices falling below a jaw-dropping $0 for the first time in history is set to be one of the most unprecedented by-products of this pandemic. Termed one of the most debilitating quarters for oil prices in the history of the ‘oil revolution,’ this recent development comes in the midst of the oil-price ‘war’ initiated by Saudi Arabia against Russia in early March. A sharp decline in factory output and transportation demands following the early stages of the 2019-2020 COVID-19 pandemic precipitated a decrease in oil demands, leading oil prices to plummet.

The Iran-Saudi standoff and the future of the Middle East peace process

Russia is fast emerging as a major power broker in the Middle East.

The world reeled from shock after two successive missile attacks targeted the Abqaiq oil facility and the Khurais oilfield in the Saudi desert last month. The real drama unfolded the morning after – thick smoke billowed from the wreckage, blotting out the early morning sun, and with it perhaps any hopes of restoring some amount of normality to Iranian-Saudi relations, at least for the foreseeable future. Over half of all the crude oil excavated in the Saudi kingdom is processed at Abqaiq. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that crude oil prices surged by 20 percent as global markets grappled with the biggest oil supply shock in decades. The Kingdom’s oil production is already running a historic low as its natural reserves face depletion, and the attacks at Abqaiq and Khurais managed to cut down global oil supply by a further 6 percent. Saudi Arabia called the September 14 attacks an act of war, and Iran stands accused of masterminding the offensive, a charge it vehemently denies. 

Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif condemned what he called Saudi attempts to provoke Iran into a full-blown military confrontation. The country remains economically besieged; heavily sanctioned by the US, with inflation in the country hitting new highs every week under the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” strategy. Zarif holds the Houthi rebels responsible for the attack, based on a statement released by the rebel faction in Yemen. Nonetheless, Tehran has not been able to produce any concrete evidence apropos of the claim. The Saudis, meanwhile, have alleged Iranian involvement after examining misfired missiles that they claim were sourced from Iran. Less than a month after the attacks on the Aramco facilities, an Iranian oil tanker, the Sabiti, was attacked while cruising the Red Sea, just off the coast of Jeddah, causing oil prices in London to surge to 60 US dollars a barrel.

NATO: Disagreement continues to dog US-Turkey relations owing to S-400

In light of the history of US-Turkey relations, it might not be very difficult to decipher the crux of the developing differences between the United States and Turkey, and to understand the rationale behind the actions and intentions of the two countries.

The ongoing tension between the two NATO allies, the United States and Turkey, recently took a pivotal course when Turkey received its first shipment of “the Russian S-400 air defense system”, its parts and components, in Ankara, at the Murted military airbase on Friday, 12 July. Subsequently, the United States reportedly put forward plans to penalize Turkey for its purchase of a Russian air defense system. Before the actual delivery, Turkey was already being warned that it “could face possible sanctions and a block on its participation in the US-made F-35 fighter jet programme because of the Russian deal.” On Wednesday, 17 July, the United States officially cancelled the delivery and sale of the F-35 aircrafts to Turkey. According to The New York Times, “The White House informed Turkey on Wednesday that would not sell F-35 stealth fighter jets to its NATO ally, in retaliation of the country’s purchase of Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile systems.”

A country’s actions and its relationship with other countries could be a demonstration of an interrelated and a convoluted web of several national and international experiences and developments. Hence, it might be interesting to observe how countries could be viewing and handling different issues in a variety of ways according to their economic, political, and social backdrop. Perhaps, the recent break in relations between the United States and Turkey could be analysed in a similar way. There is no doubt that disagreement continues to dog US-Turkey relations owing to the delivery of the Russian S-400 system to Ankara. The other side of the coin is that Trump is inherently against the NATO alliance and does not wish that the US should disproportionately bankroll the historic alliance which Turkish leaders cleverly joined in 1952.

Qatar and the Global Energy Market: The Politics of Natural Gas

Pakistan’s position in this dilemma is unique; it enjoys ties with Qatar, as well as with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

On 22 June 2019, Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani arrived in Pakistan on the invitation of Prime Minister Imran Khan for a two-day state visit. The state visit was specifically aimed at strengthening bilateral ties and improving cooperation in diverse fields between Qatar and Pakistan. In addition to the one-on-one talks between the Emir, Prime Minister Imran Khan and President Arif Alvi respectively, delegation-level meetings were also conducted between representatives of both countries. Notably, one of the most important results of this visit was the subsequent pledge for mutual cooperation with regard to gas exploration and the energy sector. The sheer competitiveness of the energy market is a stark reality. In a bid to secure a pivotal multi-billion-dollar supply contract, the Qataris reduced prices of liquefied natural gas (LNG) for Pakistan in May 2019.

With Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates both offering enticing offers concerning deferred oil and LNG payments for Pakistan, Qatar sought to modify LNG prices in order to successfully secure the deal. It is reported that presently, Qatar exports ‘500 mmcfd [million cubic feet per day] to Pakistan under a 15-year agreement struck at 13.37% of Brent crude price.’[i] Pakistan has been negotiating with a number of countries including Russia, Turkey, Malaysia, Azerbaijan and Italy with regard to attaining long-term gas deals. Saudi Arabia (and state-owned petroleum and natural gas company Aramco) has also shown interest in securing a gas deal with Pakistan.

Alexey Dedov: ‘Russia is working with Pakistan to counter terrorism’

Russia has cut down its nuclear capacity by 85 per cent over the past 30 years, says Moscow’s envoy

Together with Moscow’s ongoing campaign against Ukraine, murky Russian involvement in the bloody Syrian conflict and the recent Novichock attacks in Salisbury, UK, have badly tarnished Russia’s reputation as a responsible global power. Equally, Trump’s new policy of maligning Pakistan despite its contributions to the causes of the western world have left Islamabad in a similar predicament. Below is the media reporting on the recent talk by the Russian Ambassador in Pakistan. Keeping his promise to return that he made during his first visit to The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs in 2015, Ambassador of the Russian Federation in Pakistan Alexey Dedov arrived at the PIIA on Friday evening to a very warm welcome. Since the ambassador’s last visit, the moderator of the event said there had been a great change in the global scene and “we look with interest at Russia’s role in world affairs, especially in Syria, and other global issues”. Discussing Russia’s “stabilising role” in South Asia, Mr Dedov, who has also served in India, Bangladesh and Iran, said that the modern world was undergoing a profound transformation.

He added that they were also witnessing dynamic changes in international relations. “Globalisation and technological progress contribute to the increased independence of nations,” he said. Talking about nuclear weapons, Ambassador Dedov said that the Russia Federation stood at the forefront of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. “Russia has made unprecedented contribution to the progress of this by cutting down its nuclear capacity by 85 per cent over the last 30 years,” he said. Another very important issue, according to Mr Dedov, is the prevention of the arms race in outer space and thus excluding it from becoming a new arena and yet another battleground for military confrontation. “Thus Russia, China and Pakistan along with many others are promoting this and are in negotiation to stop weapons from going into outer space,” he said, adding that Russia was also working with Pakistan to counter terrorism.

Dr Masuma Hasan: Two Centuries of Russia’s Institute of Oriental Studies

The Russian Institute of Oriental Studies marks not only 200 years of its founding but makes a statement about a changed world

Some institutions are resilient and survive the ups and downs of fate. Others cannot sustain themselves and fall by the wayside. A great survivor is the Institute of Oriental Studies (IOS) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, which commemorates the 200th anniversary of its founding this year. The bicentennial was recently celebrated in October in Moscow with a congress. The congress itself, where I was invited to speak, was a gala event — essentially a Russian affair with marginal input from Western scholars, which is what made it remarkable. In Pakistan, we are used to only hearing about and from Western academics about the region. It coincided with Russian’s tilt to the East in world affairs, a celebration of the Asian part of its Eurasian identity. President Vladmir Putin did not attend the congress but a message from him was read out at the inauguration. As much as anything, the gathering signalled the increasingly multi-polar nature of our world.

The IOS was founded in 1818, in Russia during the reign of Emperor Alexander I. It has gone through many vicissitudes through empire, wars, invasions, revolution and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It was originally established in St. Petersburg as the Asian Museum under the Imperial Academy of Sciences, as a depository of oriental manuscripts and a library facilitating scientific research. In 1950, the institute was shifted to Moscow, becoming a major centre of oriental studies. Today its depositories house more than one million volumes of ancient books and manuscripts. In 2008, the St. Petersburg (later Leningrad) branch was reorganised into a separate Institute of Oriental Manuscripts. The institute in Moscow is a unique venue for the study of the problems in history and cultures of the Orient, especially the countries of Asia and North Africa. Hundreds of experts work there.

Speech by Dr Masuma Hasan: The East in World Politics – The New Power

Centennial Conference of the Institute of Oriental Studies Russian Academy of Sciences Moscow – 30 October 2018. Speech by Dr. Masuma Hasan: I wish to begin by paying a tribute to the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences on the 200^th anniversary of its founding – to its resilience, the remarkable academic assets it has developed over two centuries, its proud history and the excellence and dignity of its scholars. It is an honour for me to have been invited to this great event. On this occasion, I want to acknowledge the scholarship of Professor Yuri Gankovsky who headed the Centre for the Study of the Near and Middle East and also recognise the work of the present head of the Centre, Professor Vyacheslav Belokrenitsky, and his colleagues. Turning now to our subject, “The East in World Politics – the New Power”, as we have seen in recent years, the new power in the East is the tilt towards Asia.

In terms of sheer numbers, two-thirds of the world’s population or more than 5 billion people will reside in Asia by 2050 but population is declining in North America and Europe. Some analysts believe that Asia might produce half the world’s GDP by 2050 with an expansion of human capital and production. It is dominated by the strategic interests of two great powers, China and Russia, and the pitch for regional and global status by India. Today, if the East is seen as a new power in world politics, it is undoubtedly mainly due to China’s phenomenal rise and its economic and global aspirations but also because of Russia’s assertive role in global politics and “turn East” policy. China’s Belt and Road Initiative is reflected in its six economic corridors along two routes: the New Silk Road Economic Belt running west through Russia and Central Asia and the 21^st Century Maritime Road to reach Europe through South Asia and South-west Asia. One of these corridors, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor runs from Kashgar in Xinjiang to Gwadar in Pakistan and has been described as a game changer for Pakistan’s economy.